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SUMMARY 
After the Cold War, the United States (the U.S.) became the first globally leading 
superpower. At the same time, it became the first non-Eurasian leading superpower. 
After having achieved independence, its evolution has been expansionist, not only 
politically but also economically. As a consequence, even a Finnish industrial 
competitiveness policy practitioner must realize the significance of the U.S. For 
example, during the last two decades, other nations have wondered about its ability 
to grow in the digital field. Almost all the so-called digital platform companies – 
Google, Amazon, etc. – seem to come from America. Most importantly, the 
significance of the U.S. as the framework-builder of the world economy is crucial for 
others. In this report, I will assess the U.S. grand strategy, what can be said of it, and 
what Finland in general and its competitiveness policy in particular should learn from 
it. 
Officially, no grand strategy exists. Each administration brings about its own 
strategies. But on a historical continuum, certain wider policy goals remain 
unchanged. These can be best understood by paying attention to the core national 
interests. These in turn are usually interwoven with values, geopolitics, and the 
economy. Values and policies do not necessarily contradict each other, but when 
core national interests are at stake, expediency is often forced to take priority.  
The end result is a process in which the U.S. creates global order. Part of this 
process has been the creation and strengthening of the framework for economic 
interdependency and the development of rules for international trade and policy. The 
U.S. has created the world reserve currency and acts as the global lender of last 
resort. Without a dominant (and ultimately military) power, this would not be possible. 
The U.S. got entangled in the world at the latest after the emergence of nuclear 
parity – in reality, much earlier. Practically, it has no alternative but to hold on to its 
position and continue on its path. Today, it faces challenges in a rising Asia, in 
Russia's difficulty in accepting the U.S.-led world order, and in Middle East volatility. 
From the U.S. point of view, it is of utmost importance that stability and democracy 
continue in Europe. 
The U.S. Constitution established a republican and federal form of government. 
Freedom and equality before the law are core principles. Internally, the U.S. 
experience points to a gradual development of these same principles. A republican 
form of government presupposes the separation of executive, legislative and 
judiciary powers. In economic terms, these principles promote a free market 
economy. The U.S. also projects its values internationally. Foreign policy actions are 
often justified by constitutional values. What is most interesting is the observation 
that democratic states seem to handle their mutual relations peacefully. This 
observation has disrupted the balance-of-power principle of the so-called realist 
thought of school and motivates the promotion of a world order built on liberal 
principles.  
From a geopolitical point of view, the core U.S. interest is to prevent the emergence 
of a hostile Eurasian rival state or state coalition. Consequently, the most significant 
long-term geopolitical goal is the promotion of stability and democracy on the 
Eurasian continent. 
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The economy is inextricably connected to U.S. strategic thinking. Only a sufficiently 
powerful economy enables the realization of a long-term strategy. After World War II, 
the U.S. share of the global GDP was 50 percent. It is now about 25 percent and will 
gradually decline to reflect more of its global population share. The U.S. global GDP 
share should remain sufficiently high long enough to allow the realization of its long-
term strategy. 
Historically, economic policy has been adjusted according to political realities. 
Technological development affects strategic thinking. From the Declaration of 
Independence until the end of the Cold War, the foundation of U.S. economic 
strength was the techno-industrial base extensively promoted by public research 
funding. This foundation is still strong but is no longer the core of the economic 
strategy. Today, the strategy relies more on the financial sector. The strategic goal is 
to promote not only free world trade but also a global dollar-based financial market. 
The U.S. innovation system is an integral part of the above-illustrated global 
superpower project. The nation has one core comparative advantage, namely that of 
its managerial capability. The regulatory framework emphasizes consumer welfare 
and open competition. Unlike in many other economies, it is possible to build 
macroeconomic stability on monetary policy instead of fiscal policy. Public innovation 
resources are directed in the form of basic research funding to actors in the defense, 
health and energy sectors. The rise of information technologies has caused the 
share of private research funding to increase.  
Finnish EU membership has shifted the main focus of Finnish economic growth 
policy to European cooperation. However, it is vitally important to follow U.S. 
economic policy. The ongoing transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
negotiations are a culmination of a long historical chain of events. If successful, the 
result will be a so-called living agreement that opens a new gradual deepening of 
transatlantic relations.  It is in Finland’s interests to get involved early on in topics 
relevant to us.   
It would be in Finland's interest to promote cooperation with the U.S. in foresight. 
Finland should position its innovation system properly to the leading American; 
copying is not an alternative. When the premises of the U.S. innovation system 
change, we also should consider transforming, if necessary. For example, the 
changes in the post-Cold War economic policy should be analyzed more properly. 
What does it mean for us that an increasing share of value-added in the U.S. is 
created by the financial sector? 
Regarding the so-called Finnish spearheads of growth positioning to the regional and 
local U.S. innovation ecosystems would open innovation and market opportunities. 
For example, there are many hubs for cleantech, the bio-economy and the health 
sector around the U.S. to look at. Practically, cooperation requires local presence. 
More intensively adopting American managerial skills would promote Finnish 
competitiveness.  
Digitalization is a special case because the core U.S. national interests are deeply 
linked to information technologies. The past two decades have been just a prelude in 
their development. In addition to the commercial use of information technologies, the 
value base and principles of Internet governance are becoming more important. 
Regarding the cyber dimension, the U.S. needs allies, and Finland should consider 
this as a possibility.    
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The opening of  U.S. grand strategy thinking also reveals some answers to the future 
of Europe. It is useful to recall the original stages of European integration. An 
important force behind post-war integration was the U.S., as its main goal was the 
containment of Soviet communism. European integration is a European peace 
project; but after all, it is part of a wider trans-Eurasian integration project which is 
deeply linked to the long-term grand strategy of the U.S. 
Finland is geopolitically centrally located. Its foreign policy approach often takes a 
bridge-building role. In times of change, the policy approach should be sharpened. 
The task is challenging, but if successful, it will also be economically rewarding. 
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TIIVISTELMÄ  
Yhdysvallat nousi kylmän sodan päättymisen jälkeen ensimmäiseksi globaalisti 
johtavaksi suurvallaksi. Samalla se on ensimmäinen ei-euraasialainen johtava 
suurvalta. Itsenäistymisensä jälkeen maan kehitys on ollut ekspansiivista. Myös 
suomalainen elinkeinopolitiikan toimija havaitsee väistämättä Yhdysvaltain 
merkityksen. Esimerkiksi viime aikoina keskeinen ihmettely on liittynyt maan 
talouden kykyyn kasvaa digitalisaatiota hyödyntäen. Miltei kaikki ns. voittavat 
alustatalouden konseptit, Google, Amazon, jne. näyttävät olevan amerikkalaisia. 
Yhdysvaltain merkitystä maailmantalouden johtajana ei liioin voi olla huomaamatta. 
Tässä raportissa tarkastellaan mihin maan ns. suurstrategia perustuu ja mitä 
opittavaa Suomella ja suomalaisella elinkeinopolitiikalle tästä on.  
Virallisesti suurstrategiaa ei ole. Jokainen hallinto luo omat strategiansa. Mutta 
historiallisena jatkumona keskeiset päämäärät säilyvät vuosikymmenestä toiseen 
muuttumattomana. Parhaiten tätä jatkumoa voi ymmärtää tarkastelemalla maan 
elintärkeitä kansallisia intressejä. Nämä puolestaan kietoutuvat usein arvoihin, 
maantieteeseen ja talouteen. Arvot ja politiikka eivät ole välttämättä ristiriidassa 
keskenään, mutta elintärkeitä intressejä ajettaessa tarkoituksenmukaisuus menee 
usein pakon sanelemana etusijalle.    
Lopputuloksena on ollut prosessi, jossa Yhdysvallat luo globaalia 
maailmanjärjestystä. Osana tätä järjestystä on ollut olosuhteiden luominen 
taloudellisen keskinäisriippuvuuden vahvistumiselle sekä kaupan ja politiikan 
pelisääntöjen kehittäminen. Yhdysvallat ylläpitää maailmantalouden reservivaluuttaa 
ja samalla se toimii globaalitalouden viimesijaisena luotottajana. Ilman dominoivaa ja 
viime kädessä sotilaallista voimaa edellä kuvattu ei olisi mahdollista.  
Yhdysvallat kietoutui lähtemättömästi globaaliin maailmanjärjestykseen viimeistään 
ydinasetasapainon toteuduttua kylmän sodan alettua, todellisuudessa jo paljon 
aiemmin. Käytännössä sillä ei ole muuta vaihtoehtoa kuin pitää asemastaan kiinni ja 
jatkaa valitsemallaan tiellä. Tällä hetkellä sen intressejä haastavat mm. Aasian 
nousu ja tästä johtuva uuden tasapainon etsintä, Venäjän vaikeudet hyväksyä 
Yhdysvaltain luomaa maailmanjärjestystä ja Lähi-Idän arvaamattomuus. Euroopan 
demokratian ja vakauden säilyminen on Yhdysvalloille keskeinen intressi.  
Yhdysvaltain perustuslaki loi tasavaltalaisen ja federalistisen hallitusmuodon. 
Keskeisiä periaatteita ovat kansalaisten vapaus sekä yhdenvertaisuus lain edessä. 
Myös maan sisäinen kehitys heijastelee näiden periaatteiden asteittaista kehitystä. 
Tasavaltalainen hallitusmuoto edellyttää lainsäädäntö-, toimeenpano- ja 
tuomiovallan erottamista. Taloudellisessa mielessä arvomaailma toteuttaa vapaata 
markkinataloutta.  
Yhdysvallat projisoi arvojaan myös kansainvälisesti. Perustuslain arvoperustalla 
oikeutetaan usein ulkopolitiikan toimia. Mielenkiintoinen havainto on se, että 
perustuslaillisten demokratioiden eli tasavaltalaisia periaatteita noudattavien 
valtioiden on havaittu ratkovan kiistansa rauhanomaisesti. Ne ovat muutamaa 
poikkeusta lukuun ottamatta pidättäytyneet keskinäisistä sotatoimista. Havainto on 
vienyt pohjaa ns. realistisen koulukunnan voimatasapaino -ajattelulta ja motivoi 
osaltaan ns. liberaalin maailmanjärjestyksen edistämiseen.   
Geopolitiikan näkökulmasta Yhdysvaltain keskeinen intressi on estää kilpailevan 
vihamielisen euraasialaisen valtion tai valtioliiton nousu. Merkittävin pitkän aikavälin 
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tavoite on demokratian ja vakauden asteittainen toteutuminen Euraasian 
mantereella.    
Talous on kytkeytynyt erottamattomalla tavalla strategiseen ajatteluun. Vain riittävän 
vahva talous mahdollistaa suurstrategian toteuttamisen käytännössä. Toisen 
maailmansodan jälkeen USA:n BKT-osuus globaalitaloudesta oli noin 50 %, nyt se 
on noin neljännes ja laskee ennusteiden mukaan asteittain lähemmäksi maan 
väestöosuutta. BKT-osuuden tulisi säilyä riittävän korkeana riittävän pitkään, jotta 
em. strategia voisi toteutua.  
Mahdollistaakseen tavoitteidensa toteutumisen Yhdysvallat on muuntanut taloutensa 
rakenteita ja perusteita tilanteen mukaisesti.  Teknologinen kehitys on osaltaan 
vaikuttanut strategiseen ajatteluun. Noin 1900-luvun alusta aina kylmän sodan 
päättymiseen asti yksi talouden keskeisiä peruspilareita oli ns. aseteollinen 
kompleksi, jonka yhtenä eteenpäin vievänä voimana oli vahva julkinen 
tutkimuspanostus. Tuo perusta on edelleenkin voimakas, mutta ei enää 
talousstrategian keskeisin osio. Kylmän sodan jälkeen strategia nojaa aiempaa 
vahvemmin finanssisektoriin. Tavoitteena on paitsi vapaan maailmankaupan, myös 
globaalin dollarivetoisen finanssimarkkinan synnyttäminen. 
Yhdysvaltain innovaatiosysteemi rakentuu sen suurvalta-aseman lähtökohdista. 
Amerikkalaisten keskeinen kilpailuetu on heidän liikkeenjohdollinen kyvykkyytensä. 
Sääntely-ympäristö korostaa kuluttajan asemaa ja avointa kilpailua. Toisin kuin 
monissa kilpailijamaissa, makrotaloudellinen vakaus on mahdollista perustaa 
finanssipolitiikan ensisijaisuuden sijasta rahapolitiikkaan.  Julkiset 
innovaatiopanostukset kohdistuvat perustutkimuksen muodossa puolustus-, terveys- 
ja energiasektorin toimijoille. Informaatioteknologian myötä kaupallisen 
tutkimuspanostuksen osuus on kasvanut.  
Euroopan unionin jäsenyyden myötä Suomen talouskasvua edistävän politiikan 
päähuomio on kohdistunut eurooppalaiseen yhteistyöhön. Amerikkalaisen 
kehityksen seuraaminen on kuitenkin elintärkeää. Käynnissä olevat transatlanttiset 
kauppa ja investointikumppanuusneuvottelut ovat yksi vaihe pitkässä kehityskulussa 
ja sopimuksen toteutuessa Yhdysvaltain ja Euroopan taloudellinen kanssakäyminen 
syvenee. Toteutuessaan sopimus tulee olemaan ns. ”living agreement” eli integraatio 
tulee jatkumaan asteittaisena. Suomen intressi on olla mukana meille keskeisten 
asioiden valmistelussa hyvissä ajoin.   
Ennakointiyhteistyön syventäminen palvelisi Suomen intressejä. Suomen tulee 
asemoida oma innovaatiosysteeminsä oikein suhteessa johtavaan amerikkalaiseen, 
kopiointi ei ole vaihtoehto. Kun innovaatiosysteemin perusteet muuttuvat 
Yhdysvalloissa, on Suomen kaltaisten pienten valtioiden osattava muuntautua. 
Erityisesti kylmän sodan jälkeinen muutos amerikkalaisen talouspolitiikan 
perusteissa tulisi arvioida tarkemmin. Mitä tarkoittaa esimerkiksi Suomen kannalta 
se, että yhä suurempi osa amerikkalaisesta arvonmuodostuksesta syntyy 
finanssisektorilla? 
Suomen kasvun kärkien osalta asemoituminen alueellisiin ja paikallisiin innovaatio- 
ja yrityskeskittymiin avaisi paitsi markkinoita, myös uusia kehitysnäkymiä.  
Biotalouden ja cleantechin sekä esimerkiksi digitaalisen terveysteknologian 
osaamiskeskuksia on eri puolilla Yhdysvaltoja. Käytännössä yhteistyö edellyttää 
paikallista läsnäoloa. Amerikkalaisen liikkeenjohdon ”manageriaalisen” kyvyn 
laajempi omaksuminen lisäisi suomalaista kilpailukykyä.   
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Digitalisaatio on erityistapaus, sillä Yhdysvaltain elintärkeät kansalliset intressit 
kytkeytyvät merkittävällä tavalla informaatioteknologiaan. Menneet kaksi 
vuosikymmentä ovat olleet internetin kehityksen kannalta vasta alkusoittoa. Jatkossa 
yhä tärkeämmäksi nousee kyber-avaruuden hallinnoinnin periaatteet ja taustalla 
oleva arvoperusta. Kyberulottuvuuden suhteen pätee sama kuin monen muunkin 
alan suhteen. Yhdysvallat tarvitsee liittolaisia. Myös Suomelle tässä avautuu 
mahdollisuus. 
Yhdysvaltain suurstrategian avaaminen raottaa myös vastausta Euroopan 
tulevaisuudesta. On syytä palauttaa mieleen eurooppalaisen integraation 
syntyvaiheet ja -syyt. Toisen maailmansodan jälkeen integraatioprosessin 
käynnistämisen taustavaikuttaja oli Yhdysvallat, keskeinen päämäärä Neuvostoliiton 
kommunismin patoaminen. Kyseessä oli alusta asti paitsi Euroopan kansojen 
rauhanprojekti, myös trans-Euraasialainen integraatioprojekti, joka linkittyy 
Yhdysvaltain pitkän aikavälin suurstrategiaan.   
Suomi sijaitsee geopoliittisesti tärkeällä paikalla. Se on ulkopolitiikassaan toteuttanut 
sillanrakentajan tehtävää. Murrosvaiheissa tuota roolia pitää terävöittää. Tehtävä on 
paitsi haasteellinen, onnistuessaan myös taloudellisesti palkitseva.  
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1 Background 
The Ministry of the Employment and the Economy (the MEE) in Finland has been 
actively studying and analyzing the foundations of national economic livelihood, 
many of its peers have undoubtedly done the same. This discussion usually deals 
with the so-called internal competitiveness factors; factors within the reach of 
domestic decision-making. Usually, it has little to do with external factors, that is to 
say with those factors that shape the environment in which economic activity takes 
place. These are usually regarded as distant and out-of-reach for domestic policy-
makers and thus as something not included in the discussion. 
Regarding the internal factors, three recent studies have been made by the MEE. 
First, industrial competitiveness was studied, paying attention to the recent trends in 
globalization.1 The key lessons from this study are summarized in the following. 
During the last twenty years, the world economy has witnessed an increasing 
geographic unbundling of value chains. Multinational enterprises now have a bigger 
possibility to optimize their business functions geographically in those spots that they 
see as best serving their interests. Even within an individual company, different tasks 
can be located optimally. This has led to a situation where national economies 
compete for the high value-added parts of these chains. The new productivity source 
is increasingly the individual. The trend has been enabled by the free and fast flow of 
information (by its digitalization), the containerization of sea and land transportation, 
and the increasing flow of international trade.  
Especially hard hit has been the traditional economic backbone of the industrialized 
world, namely that of manufacturing. The more the GDP per capita grows, the 
smaller manufacturing’s GDP share becomes. Manufacturing employment has 
dramatically diminished in many countries, including in the U.S., and what is often 
not noticed is that regardless of increasing global demand for manufactured goods, 
overall global manufacturing employment is increasing very modestly, due to 
automation and productivity gains. Still, the best manufacturing employment is highly 
value-adding due to its high innovation potential. Competition for these jobs is 
severe.    
The valued added of Finnish manufacturing has declined dramatically from 2007 to 
the present. This was mainly due to Nokia’s boom and decline but there is also an 
overall underlying declining trend in some other industries as well. As seen by the 
recent MEE2 study, in order to increase the value added of Finnish manufacturing, 
four general transitions should be promoted as follows. Regarding individual Finnish 
companies, it becomes increasingly crucial to engage geographically and 
thematically into areas of 1) growing global market needs by 2) producing more 
innovative solutions. Because of the above illustrated trends, for an individual 
company it becomes increasingly important to be able to 3) manage the global value 
and supply chains. Managerial skills are increasingly valuable. Assembly for 
example, depending of the business branch in question, is not usually the most 
critical part of the value chain anymore, although in some cases it may well be the 
core competitive factor. The most valuable parts of the value chains are usually 
those related to the headquarter functions. For Finland, as a national economy it is 
vital to be able to 4a) channel a fair share of the company value added to itself. This 
                                                     
1  https://www.tem.fi/files/37744/TEMjul_9_2013_web_17102013.pdf 
2    https://www.tem.fi/en/current_issues/publications/manufacturing_as_part_of_a_vital_ 
      enterprise_structure.98158.xhtml 
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is not automatic anymore because the interests of companies and national 
economies do not always converge. To increase the resilience of the Finnish 
national economy 4b) the company base and their field of business branches should 
be widened.  
Typically Finnish industrial competitiveness policy has relied on a horizontal 
approach that guarantees a competitive framework for all industries to succeed. As a 
small national economy with limited resources, selections at some level must be 
made. For example, we cannot maintain crucial research infrastructure in every field. 
Three broad thematic growth areas were identified as possible growth areas, namely 
bio-economy, cleantech, and digitalization.  
In developed economies, service branches now represent about 70 to 80 percent of 
the total value added. It becomes more and more important to understand its value-
creation processes and productivity potential. This was discussed in the most recent 
discussion paper – Service Economy Revolution and Digitalization.3 In conclusion, 
economic restructuring will also continue within the service economy. Due to the 
nature of digitalization, the winning concept usually takes it all. We see this tendency 
in retail business for example, where e-commerce replaces the old established 
agents. Businesses that used to have a well-established local customer base, 
suddenly face global competition. It is vital that Finland produces globally winning 
concepts and business-platforms. 
Increasingly, service-dominant logic will also affect the traditional manufacturing 
industries. Digitalization is all about information and global businesses will exploit its 
full potential by using big data and powerful algorithms embedded in more 
sophisticated business platforms. Take Google as an example. To support 
innovation, security, growth, and a free flow of information, clear regulatory rules and 
an institutional framework will become more and more necessary. How and by whom 
this is shaped is important.  
Finland is a small open economy. It has greatly benefited from free and rules-based 
world trade. It has also greatly benefited from its EU membership. Without access to 
the high seas and to open information flow, the very foundations of her economic 
success would be gone. Conversely, improved access and a still more open and 
predictable world economy would be beneficial.   
Finnish industrial competitiveness policies have thus an internal aspect that is 
subject to the decision-making of our own political and economic actors. But there is 
also an external aspect. The space in which Finnish businesses compete is very 
much subject to the wider world order. The external framework, the world order 
around us, is often taken as granted. However, it is in a constant flux.  
After two decades of being part of the EU, many policies, including industrial policy, 
are considered in a domestic and EU framework. There are limits to this. The danger 
is that our vision becomes myopic. The often neglected fact is that it is impossible to 
understand Europe and its policies without looking both east and west.  
As the world’s most powerful nation, the very existence of the United States (later 
the U.S.) bears implications for other nation states. It is crucial to understand and 
anticipate its actions given that it has a GDP that represents one quarter of the 
world’s total, it simultaneously has a GDP per capita that is one of the highest on 
                                                     
3  http://www.tem.fi/files/43374/TEMjul_41_2015_web_22062015.pdf 
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earth, it has the most powerful military and spends half of the world’s military 
expenditure, it has a technological advantage in many fields, etcetera.  
However powerful, the U.S. is not omnipotent. Nor can it take its position as granted, 
although there are good reasons to think that it will maintain its status. Especially as 
it has a population not more than five percent of the world’s total, it cannot act alone. 
In a world with serious geopolitical fault lines, the U.S. also has to react to the 
existing realities. The world around is dynamic. 
In the following, I will make an effort to understand what can be said about the 
behavior of the U.S. and then try to apply these lessons to the Finnish economic 
discussion.  
I am curious to see to what extent we can speak about a U.S. grand strategy. By 
definition, I consider a grand strategy to be something that gives principled guidance 
to actions that define more or less all important policy fields. The following is based 
on my previous personal policy studies, academic and professional work, and 
especially on a recent study trip to the U.S. During the trip I had the opportunity to 
discuss and share thoughts with a wide range of experts (appendix 1). 4 5 6 7 
2 In search of a U.S. grand strategy 
Neither the U.S., nor any other country, has an official grand strategy. Instead, policy 
strategies like the National Security Strategy, National Military Strategies, etcetera 
form the bases for everyday policy-making. Each administration has its own 
priorities. What is perhaps more interesting is whether we can find something that 
would be more constant, not altering from one administration to another but 
something that would help understand the very essence of the long-run U.S. 
behavior. It is more important what happens than what is said. 
For this purpose, an interesting and useful way to look at the topic is offered by Dr. 
Richard Hooker. Hooker points out that the core of a national grand strategy is to 
preserve the core strategic (national) interests.8 Defined this way, the main elements 
of a grand strategy have (once the U.S. was fully established) remained remarkably 
consistent. It becomes all about using power to secure the state. 
Broadly speaking, the U.S. vital interests are 1) the defense of American territory and 
that of its allies, 2) protecting American citizens at home and abroad, 3) supporting 
and defending constitutional values and forms of government, and 4) promoting and 
securing the U.S. economy and standard of living. 
Today, these interests are tested in a world where the bipolar (Westphalian) state 
system of the Cold War has given way to a more multipolar system featuring 1) a 
militarily and economically dominant but not all-powerful U.S., 2) a rising China and 
                                                     
4  Ministerial Adviser Martti Myllylä works at the MEE at its Enterprise and Innovation Department and 
has recently been responsible for policy analyses on economic competitiveness. The interest to 
combine economic issues with wider policy issues rises partly from his academic background. 
5   I especially thank Sheila R. Ronis for organizing the majority of my meetings and discussions. 
6  This travel report does not report all the discussions had during my trip. Instead, it reflects my 
personal, gradually developing understanding regarding the issue. The discussions during the trip 
had an important impact on this.   
7   Neither the conclusions nor the report as a whole represent any official policy of Finland.  
8  R. D. Hooker, Jr. The Grand Strategy of the U.S. Institute for National Strategic Studies. National 
Defense University. 2015. http://lab.isn.ethz.ch/service/streamtest.php?id=184760 
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India, 3) a resurgent Russia, 4) an economically potent but militarily declining 
Europe, 5) an unstable and violence-prone Middle East, 6) a proliferation of weak 
and failed states, and 7) empowered international and nongovernmental 
organizations, and non-state actors. 
In this system the biggest threats that the U.S. is facing are 1) weapons of mass 
destruction used against the homeland, 2) economic disruption from without, 3) the 
rise of a hostile peer competitor, and 4) direct challenges to key allies. 
To illustrate the concept of core national interest within this framework, one may look 
at Syria for example.  In Syria there seems to be no direct threat to the homeland, to 
U.S. citizens or to those of its allies, or to the economy. Despite the humanitarian 
tragedy unfolding, the prospects for a large-scale military intervention seem low. 
In Ukraine, the situation is somewhat different. With the annexation of Crimea and 
the hostilities in Eastern Ukraine, the long constructed post-war security architecture 
has been thrown over. Especially so when the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, under 
which Ukraine agreed to surrender its nuclear weapons in exchange for Russian 
guarantees of its territorial integrity, was violated. The Ukrainian case has triggered 
the use of economic sanctions but not a resort to a direct military confrontation for 
the time being. 
In case of possible aggression, in the Baltic States for example, the case would be 
even clearer. It would be more likely than not that the U.S. would respond and would 
encourage its NATO allies to do the same. Failure to do so would not only collapse 
the NATO-alliance but the confidence among its alliance systems elsewhere. This 
would be considered a core national interest by any U.S. administration, although 
selling this perspective to the general public would be not simple. 
U.S. global primacy is heavily linked to its capability to secure the undisturbed 
functioning of the world economy. The free flow of oil from the Middle East is 
perhaps not crucial for its own needs anymore. But it is more about securing the 
world economy’s proper functioning that is in question. U.S. presidents have usually 
acted decisively when important economic interests have been in question.   
Hooker points out that the means to foster grand strategy are similarly enduring over 
time. Its basic components include 1) fostering strong alliances and bilateral security 
arrangements, 2) maintaining a strong and survivable nuclear deterrent, 3) fielding 
balanced, powerful, and capable military forces, and 4) providing intelligence 
services that can ensure global situational awareness and provide strategic early 
warning. 
These means are intrinsically linked to a 1) powerful economy and industrial base, 2) 
advanced technology, 3) an extensive military reserve component, 4) an educated 
and technically skilled population to fit for military service, and 5) a political system 
that is based on classical liberal democratic values and able to make clear and 
sustainable policy and resource decisions. Although these means still offer the U.S. 
a preponderant position, a gradual erosion of this base is visible at least in a relative 
sense.  
Typically, America’s solutions to meeting threats to core national interests are not 
new, although the technologies employed are. These solutions can be summarized 
in a following way. 1) The first principle is to meet the threat as far from the 
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homeland as possible. 2) It is important to use all available tools sooner rather than 
later and rely on intelligence, diplomacy, forward presence, and economic power. 3) 
Whenever possible, the issue should be addressed in tandem with allies, partners, or 
likeminded states working through international organization like UN, NATO, 
etcetera. 4) The U.S. also attempts to actively shape the international security 
environment to prevent or ward off security challenges. 5) As a last resort, military 
force may be used. 
Military force has been used many times since the end of World War II. The 
operations have usually been successful when the threats to vital interests have 
been 1) unambiguous, 2) when the response enjoyed strong support from the public 
and Congress, 3) when overwhelming force was applied, 4) when strong alliances 
participated, and 5) when the strategic objectives were well understood. This 
superiority is best translated into battlefield and campaign success when translated 
into the synergistic appliance of air, space, sea, cyber, and land power. 
The net effect has been to bring into being a rules-based international and economic 
order that has widely benefited much of the world.  
 It falls to the dominant state to create the conditions under which 
economic interdependence can take hold (by providing security, rules 
of the game, a reserve currency, and by acting as the global economy’s 
banker and lender of last resort). Without a dominant power to perform 
these tasks, economic interdependence does not happen. Indeed, free 
trade and interdependence have occurred in the modern international 
system only during hegemonies of Victorian Britain and post-war 
America.9 
 
The trend will be a continuation of a trajectory toward ever-greater civil-military 
integration, particularly in the intelligence, cyber, acquisition, logistics, and 
consequence management realms. 
The U.S. inherited its position from Britain. Lord Palmerston, the British Prime 
Minister in the19th century, famously said that Britain had no permanent friends or 
permanent enemies, only permanent interests. The American ideology and the 
American reality are not inherently incompatible. But two things must be faced. First, 
the U.S. cannot give away the power it has. There is no practical way to do that. 
Second, given the vastness of that power, it will be involved in conflicts whether it 
wants to be or not. Empires are frequently feared, sometimes respected, but never 
loved by the rest of the world. And pretending that you are not an empire fools no 
one. 
Because the core national interests are wrapped around values, geopolitics, and 
economy, I will try to dig a little deeper into each of them. 
 
 
 
                                                     
9  Christopher Layne. Rethinking American Grand Strategy: Hegemony or Balance of Power in the 
Twenty-First Century?  
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3 The U.S., liberal values, and the world order  
 
The Constitution 
The Declaration of Independence codified the core American values. These in turn 
laid also out the first strategy. Because all men are created equal, the government 
requires the consent of the governed. Life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness (not 
the promise of prosperity) were set to be people’s right. British colonies went to war 
to absolve themselves from allegiance to the British crown – they declared 
commitment to a common cause and assumed the right to wage war and conclude 
peace. 
The U.S. Constitution was formed and approved by the thirteen eastern states in 
1787. After the Constitution was ratified, it replaced the Articles of Confederation, 
ultimately paving way for an effective republican and federal government. The Bill of 
Rights further clarified the ideals. The establishment of the United States of America 
as a voluntary union of several states with separate and different foundational 
characteristics, modes of government, economic structures, ethnic and linguistic 
make-ups, and political aspirations was codified in the Constitution through the 
devolution of only a restricted set of powers to the Federal level. The inherent 
tension was – to some extent – resolved in the Civil War of 1861-65. 
Enlightenment era philosophers had great influence. British political philosopher 
John Locke was a major influence, expanding on the contract theory of government 
advanced by Thomas Hobbes. Locke advanced the principle of the consent of the 
governed in his Two Treatises of Government. The government's duty under a social 
contract among the sovereign people was to serve them by protecting their rights. 
These basic rights were life, liberty, and property. 
Montesquieu emphasized the need for balanced forces pushing against each other 
to prevent tyranny. In his The Spirit of the Laws, Montesquieu argues that the 
separation of state powers should be in the service of people's liberty. Separating 
legislative, executive, and judicial power guarantee that liberty is respected.  
Alexis de Tocqueville warned about the ‘tyranny of the majority’ in a democracy and 
advocated the rights of minorities. He warned that the courts needed to protect their 
rights by reversing efforts by voters to terminate the rights of an unpopular minority. 
The Federalist Papers (1787–1788) by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and 
John Jay discussed the defining principles in detail. 
Republicanism stresses liberty and ‘unalienable’ rights as central values, makes the 
people as a whole sovereign, rejects aristocracy and inherited political power, 
expects citizens to be independent in their performance of civic duties, and vilifies 
corruption. For the ‘Founding Fathers,’ republicanism represented more than a 
particular form of government. It was a way of life, a core ideology, an 
uncompromising commitment to liberty, and a total rejection of aristocracy. 
The term ‘republicanism’ is derived from the term ‘republic,’ but the two words have 
different meanings. A ‘republic’ is a form of government (one without a hereditary 
ruling class) while ‘republicanism’ is a political ideology that can appear in republics 
or monarchies. In the U.S., two major parties were explicitly named after the idea—
the Republican Party of Thomas Jefferson (founded in 1793, and often called the 
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‘Democratic-Republican Party’ and the predecessor of the current Democratic Party) 
and the current Republican Party (founded in 1854). 
Domestically, the search for values has been a living process and continues to be. 
But no effort to look for a fundamentally different constitutional setting can be 
identified. The Constitution as a basic set of principles has survived for more than 
two hundred years. 
Values and international relations 
Two competing approaches dominate the study of international relations. The realist 
school has been dominant and stresses the Hobbesian world view that international 
relations are a constant state of war between states. The crucial concept is that of 
the balance of power.  
The other significant approach has been labeled as the liberal or idealist school of 
thought. The basic tenet is a belief in progress and liberal values. Over time these 
competing but also overlapping schools of thought have evolved into different forms. 
Realism has dominated and occasionally argued that liberalism is utopian.   
Crucially, in 1983 Micheal Doyle10 discovered empirically that liberalism appears to 
disrupt the pursuit of balance-of-power politics. The crucial finding was that 
democracies rarely go to war with each other and have a tendency to solve their 
mutual conflicts peacefully. This has strengthened the prospects for world peace 
established by the steady expansion of a separate peace among liberal societies.  
Philosophically and intellectually, this finding forced scholars to look at the 
foundations of liberal theory. Doyle argued that among liberals, Immanuel Kant offers 
the best explanation. In 1795 Kant, based on his rational reasoning and not any 
empiricism, argued in his essay Perpetual Peace that there are three definitive 
articles that the ‘practical idea of perpetual peace’ requires. These are: 
1. The civil constitution of every state shall be republican’ 
2. ‘The law of nations shall be founded on a federation of free states’ 
3. ‘The law of world citizenship shall be limited to conditions of universal hospitality’ 
 
If this metaphorical ‘treaty’ were signed by all nations, perpetual peace would be 
established. Summarizing Kant, it is first the moral duty of a politician to look for this 
to happen. Second, because politicians do not follow moral duties as a block, it 
becomes a gradual and long historical process in which ‘nature compels’ the world to 
do so. 
The first definitive article of Kant’s essay holds that the civil constitution of a state 
must be republican. This means a political society that has solved the problem of 
combining the moral autonomy of individualism and social order. In the private 
sphere, a basically private-property and market-oriented economy partially 
addresses this requirement. The public, or political, sphere is more troubling. The 
answer is a republic that preserves juridical freedom – the legal equality of citizens 
as subjects – on the basis of a representative government with a separation of 
powers. 
                                                     
10  Michael W. Doyle. Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs. Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 
12. No. 3 (Summer, 1983). 
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The republican form of representation and the separation of powers are produced 
because they are the means by which the state is ‘organized well’ to prepare for and 
meet foreign threats and to tame the ambitions of selfish and aggressive individuals 
internally. States that are not organized in this fashion will remain internally fragile 
and risk a possibility to fail. It is not to say that a republican form of governance could 
not itself fail. Rather, the argument is that if this happens for some reason, there is 
an inherent tendency to return back.  
The second definitive article states how republics, once established, lead to peaceful 
relations. When the consent of the people is needed to decide on war, it is the 
natural inclination of a citizen to avoid the costs of war and destruction. Liberal wars 
are fought only for popular, liberal purposes. Liberal states go to war with illiberal 
states if needed and usually to fight for their liberal cause: freedom. But they are 
extremely hesitant to go to war with each other and prefer to settle their internal 
disputes in peaceful manner. The world will  achieve perpetual peace gradually in 
the long course of history and after many unsuccessful attempts. But in the 
meantime, the ‘pacific union’ of liberal states steadily expands, bringing within it 
more and more republics (despite republican collapses, backsliding, and war 
disasters). 
The third definitive article limits the right of foreigners to hospitality, denying 
automatic citizenship.  
Liberal economic theory holds that these cosmopolitan ties derive from a 
cooperative international division of labor and free trade according to 
comparative advantage. Each economy is said to be better off than it would be 
under autarky. Each thus acquires an incentive to avoid policies that would lead the 
other to break these economic ties. Keeping open markets rests upon the 
assumption that the next set of transactions will also be determined by prices rather 
that coercion; a sense of mutual security is vital to avoid security-motivated searches 
for economic autarky. Thus avoiding a challenge to another liberal state’s security or 
even enhancing each other’s security by means of alliance naturally follows 
economic interdependence. 
The spirit of commerce, which is incompatible with war, sooner or later 
gains the upper hand in every state. As the power of money is perhaps 
the most dependable of all the powers (means) included under the 
state power, states see themselves forced, without any moral urge, to 
promote honorable peace and by mediation to prevent war wherever it 
threatens to break out. They do so exactly as if they stood in perpetual 
alliances, for great offensive alliances are in the nature of the case rare 
and even less often successful.11  
 
A further source of liberal peace is that the international market removes the 
difficult decisions of production and distribution from the direct sphere of 
state policy. States can stand aside from these contentious market rivalries. 
Interdependence creates crosscutting transnational ties that serve as lobbies for 
mutual accommodation. 
Liberal states have not escaped the realist security dilemma, but the effects of 
international anarchy have been tamed. The political bond of liberal rights and 
                                                     
11  See Kant. Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch. 
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interests have proven to be a remarkably firm foundation for mutual non-aggression. 
A separate peace exists among liberal states. 
In 1795 there were three liberal regimes. The Swiss Cantons and the French 
Republic (1790–1795) and the U.S. (1776 – present day).  
 
The practicability (objective reality) of this idea of federation, which 
should gradually spread to all states and thus lead to perpetual peace, 
can be proved. For if fortune directs that a powerful and enlightened 
people can make itself a republic, which by its nature must be inclined 
to perpetual peace, this gives a fulcrum to the federation with other 
states so that they may adhere to it and thus secure freedom under the 
idea of the law of nations. By more and more such associations, the 
federation may be gradually extended.12 
 
Today’s liberal world order 
We have witnessed, in the long journey of human history, a gradual constitutional 
development taking place. Since the emergence of the first high cultures, a gradual 
transition towards organized and governed national entities is evident. Figure 1 
illustrates the trends in governance during the last two hundred years. Overall, the 
number of nation states has increased, indicating that the centrifugal forces 
representing nationalistic tendencies have occurred while colonialism faded. But at 
the same time, especially since the end of World War II, the number of 
democratically governed states has increased. The number of autocracies has 
decreased since the 1970s. What is noteworthy, is that the amount of anocracies 
(states between democracies and autocracies) and so-called ‘failed states’ where 
institutional order seems to be lacking, has been on the rise.  
Figure 1. Global trends in governance, 1800–2012 
  Source: http://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html 
 
 
                                                     
12  Kant, ibid. 
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Figure 2. Regimes by type in 2013 
 
 
Source: http://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html 
 
A functioning democracy takes time to develop and is difficult to be forced upon a 
nation by outsiders. Overall, however, since the establishment of the U.S., many 
democratically governed states representing republican ideals have seen the light 
and there are strong forces continuing this tendency. 
The institutional order has taken significant steps. The League of Nations, the United 
Nations, multilateral arrangements among nations, etcetera have been established. 
International law is a developing field that so far only vaguely reflects the rational 
idea of a world law. Its sources lie in treaties between states, international customs, 
and general principles.  
Inefficient in preventing World War II, the League of Nations was replaced by the 
United Nations. So far, it has been the key institutional framework where decisions to 
justify the use of coercion have been made. The veto power within the United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC) has been the privilege of the winners of World War 
II. From a normative as well from a formal ground, it has deficiencies that should at 
some point be reformed. It has functioned – although we have seen examples where 
it has been proven inefficient and its authority has been neglected (Kosovo was a 
precedent). Only recently, Russia has been arguing against the use of force against 
ISIL without the formal approval of the UNSC – a claim that has been dismissed by 
the West after the Ukrainian crisis. 
Principles regarding national self-determination are still a complex issue. 
Nevertheless, they have been touched upon occasionally. One can recall the 
Responsibility to Protect principle, OSCE principles to respect existing borders, the 
Montevideo principles that define the requirements of a recognizable state, etcetera. 
However, a clear set of principles regarding the right to national self-determination is 
lacking. 
The U.S. has been active in building an institutionalized world order based on its own 
core values. Security-wise, NATO has been the key institute. In the preamble of its 
charter, the participants swear to democratic values. Its fifth article speaks about 
mutual defense, whereas its second speaks about economic co-operation and 
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institutions. Economy-wise, the Bretton Woods institutions have been the most 
important players.  
G. John Ikenberry states that the current world order13 is based on liberal ideas and 
that this order is not in decline – quite the opposite. Historically the U.S. has been 
the central player, but ultimately the liberal world order is neither a U.S. nor a 
Western invention. The claims that the emerging-market states are learning to 
combine market economics with traditional autocratic (or semi-autocratic) politics in a 
process that signals an intellectual rejection of the Western economic model are just 
wrong.  
According to Ikenberry, this panicked narrative misses a deeper reality. Although the 
U.S. position in the global system is changing, the liberal international order is alive 
and well. The struggle over international order today is not about fundamental 
principles. China and other emerging great powers do not want to contest the basic 
rules and principles of the liberal international order. Instead, they wish to gain more 
authority and leadership within it. Indeed, today's power transition represents not the 
defeat of the liberal order but its ultimate ascendance. Brazil, China, and India have 
all become more prosperous and capable by operating inside the existing 
international order – benefiting from its rules, practices, and institutions, including the 
World Trade Organization and the newly organized G-20. Their economic success 
and growing influence are tied to the liberal internationalist organization of world 
politics, and they have deep interests in preserving that system.  
It is easy to see why Ikenberry’s views regarding China’s ambitions may be doubted 
by some. China’s ‘innovation mercantilism’ for example, is seen not only in the light 
of economic catching up but also as a path to hegemony.14 Whatever the truth, in 
practical terms, the U.S. is taking Asia’s and China’s rise seriously. The Obama 
administration’s re-balance to Asia wants to use a wide array of tools to strengthen 
the U.S. position (again) in the Asia Pacific region where the most economically 
dynamic markets are. The Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations (TPP) with Asia are 
regarded as strategically important, more so than the European counterpart, which is 
more about vitalizing the relationship with the U.S. and the Europe. 
The U.S. played an active role in the first steps of the post-war European integration. 
The recent developments regarding the transatlantic integration process have taken 
the form of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership negotiations (TTIP). 
Multilateral trade agreements are (at least for the time being) replacing bilateral 
ones, putting the U.S. at center and in the driver’s seat – even more so than before. 
But after all, before digging into geopolitics, there is one fundamental question to be 
answered. Does the U.S. believe that the basic values of the republican form of 
government, so deeply embedded in its Constitution, will in the long run disrupt the 
pursuit of balance-of-power politics and pave the way for something resembling the 
Kantian idea of the federation of free states? This is sometimes said publicly. But 
more importantly, the way the U.S. promotes its core national interests seems to 
imply a positive answer. Again, actions speak louder than words. 
                                                     
13  http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67730/g-john-ikenberry/the-future-of-the-liberal-world-order 
14  Chinese innovation mercantilism is discussed by Robert D. Atkinson and Stephen J. Ezell. See 
Innovation Economics. The Race for Global Advantage. Yale University Press. 2012. 
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4 U.S. grand strategy and geography 
4.1  Geopolitics as a tool to understand international relations 
Core national interests are often geopolitically oriented. Things happen in places. 
Geopolitics is a method of foreign policy analysis that seeks to understand, explain, 
and predict international political behavior, primarily in terms of geographical 
variables. Its origins are rooted to the realistic school of international relations that 
stresses the anarchical nature of the international system and the primacy of states 
as the main actors. But ultimately, it is not necessarily in contradiction with liberal-
minded thinking.    
Broadly speaking, it is useful to look at the world’s geography and realize two 
important competing visions.  
First, in the U.S., Alfred Thayer Mahan – a frequent commentator on world naval 
strategic and diplomatic affairs – believed that national greatness was inextricably 
associated with the sea and particularly with its commercial use in peace and its 
control in war. Mahan proposed six conditions required for a nation to have sea 
power: 
1. An advantageous geographical position 
2. Serviceable coastlines, abundant natural resources, and a favorable climate 
3. Big enough territory 
4. A population large enough to defend its territory 
5. A society with an aptitude for the sea and commercial enterprise  
6. A government with the influence and inclination to dominate the sea 
 
The principal idea can be stated as the following: ‘Who controls the world’s 
oceans, controls the world.’ 
On the other hand, in Britain Sir Halford Mackinder's Heartland concept showing the 
situation of the ‘pivot area’ was established his Theory of the Heartland, formulated 
in his article entitled The Geographical Pivot History, published in 1904. Mackinder's 
doctrine of geopolitics involved concepts diametrically opposed to the notion of 
Mahan about the significance of navies in world conflict. He saw the navy as the 
basis of the Colombian era empire (roughly from 1492 to the nineteenth century) and 
predicted that power in the twentieth century would be determined by land power. 
The basic notions of Mackinder's doctrine involve considering the geography of the 
Earth as being divided into two sections: the World Island or the Core, comprising 
Eurasia and Africa; and the peripheral ‘islands’, including the Americas, Australia, 
Japan, the British Isles, and Oceania. Not only was the periphery noticeably smaller 
than the World Island, it necessarily required much sea transport to function at the 
technological level of the World Island – which contained sufficient natural resources 
for a developed economy. 
Mackinder called the World Island region the Heartland. It essentially comprised 
Central and Eastern Europe: Ukraine, Western Russia, and Mitteleuropa. The 
Heartland contained the grain reserves of Ukraine and many other natural resources. 
Mackinder's notion of geopolitics was summed up when he said: ‘Who rules Central 
and Eastern Europe commands the Heartland. Who rules the Heartland 
commands the World Island. Who rules the World Island commands the 
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World.’ His doctrine was influential during the World Wars and the Cold War, as 
Germany and later Russia each made territorial strides toward the ‘Heartland’. 
Figure 3. Mackinder’s geopolitical division 
 
 
 
 
Following Mackinder, Zbigniew Brzezinski, in his book The Grand Chessboard: 
American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives (1997), developed a strategy for 
the U.S. to retain its global hegemony. He renamed the Eurasian Heartland the 
Grand Chessboard, and defined five countries as ‘pivots’ to control the Eurasian 
landmass: France, Germany, Russia, China, and India. As a National Security 
Advisor for various presidents, Brzezinski's ideas have influenced U.S. foreign policy 
since 1977. 
According to Brzezinski, for the first time ever, a non-Eurasian power has emerged 
not only as the key arbiter of Eurasian power relations but also as the world’s 
paramount power. The defeat and collapse of the Soviet Union was the final step in 
the rapid ascendance of a Western Hemisphere power – the U.S. – as the sole and, 
indeed, the first truly global power. 
Eurasia is thus the Grand Chessboard on which the struggle for global primacy 
continues to be played, and that struggle involves geostrategy – the strategic 
management of geopolitical interests. If America does not lead, the alternative is 
chaos! In 1997 Brzezinski wrote: 
A sustainable strategy for Eurasia must distinguish among the more 
immediate short-run perspective of the next five years or so, the 
medium term of 20 or so years, and the long run beyond that. 
Moreover, these phases must be viewed not as watertight 
compartments but as part of a continuum. In the short run, the U.S. 
should consolidate and perpetuate the prevailing geopolitical pluralism 
on the map of Eurasia. This strategy will put a premium on political 
maneuvering and diplomatic manipulation, preventing the emergence 
of a hostile coalition that could challenge America's primacy, not to 
mention the remote possibility of any one state seeking to do so. By the 
medium term, the foregoing should lead to the emergence of 
strategically compatible partners which, prompted by American 
leadership, might shape a more cooperative trans-Eurasian security 
system. In the long run, the foregoing could become the global core of 
genuinely shared political responsibility. 
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In the western periphery of Eurasia, the key players will continue to be 
France and Germany, and America's central goal should be to continue 
to expand the democratic European bridgehead. In the Far East, China 
is likely to be increasingly pivotal, and the U.S. will not have a Eurasian 
strategy unless a Sino-American political consensus is nurtured. In 
Eurasia's center, the area between an enlarging Europe and a 
regionally rising China will remain a political black hole until Russia 
firmly redefines itself as a post-imperial state. Meanwhile, to the south 
of Russia, Central Asia threatens to become a caldron of ethnic 
conflicts and great-power rivalries. 
 
Figure 4. The Eurasian Chessboard of Zbigniew Brzezinski 
 
 
4.2 The U.S. – an inevitable superpower and its geopolitical grand strategy 
Based on Mahanian and McKinderian ideas, the founder of Stratfor, George 
Friedman, argues that the U.S. has five geopolitical imperatives that dominate its 
foreign policy. During the petroleum era, whoever controls the larger Mississippi river 
basin has the keys to control the world. The cost benefit that a navigable river 
system within one of the most fertile landmasses on earth gives for capital 
accumulation offers a great advantage for those living there. Similarly, the most 
powerful economic powerhouses on the globe are those that are located on great 
navigable rivers and fertile lands that help capital accumulation as well as economic 
and political unification (Germany, France, etc.).   
According to Friedman, the U.S. should: 
1. Dominate the Greater Mississippi Basin 
2. Eliminate all land-based threats to the Greater Mississippi Basin 
3. Control the ocean approaches to North America 
4. Control the world's oceans  
5. Prevent any potential challengers from rising 
 
The U.S. has been able to promote these imperatives one by one. The early history 
of the nation had much to deal with the first three.  
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After World War II, the U.S. consolidated its power, creating a global architecture to 
entrench its position. The first stage of this – naval domination – was achieved 
quickly and easily. The U.S. Navy at the beginning of World War II was already a 
respectable institution, but after three years of fighting across two oceans it had 
achieved both global reach and massive competency. Equally important was the fact 
that, as of August 1945, with the notable exception of the British Royal Navy, every 
other navy in the world had been destroyed. As impressive as the U.S.'s absolute 
gains in naval power had been, its relative gains were grander still. There simply was 
no competition. Always a maritime merchant power, the U.S. could now marry its 
economic advantages to absolute dominance of the seas and all global trade routes.  
Friedman further points out, that over the next few years the U.S.'s undisputed naval 
supremacy allowed the Americans to impose a series of changes on the international 
system. 
 The formation of NATO in 1949 placed all of the world's surviving naval assets 
under American strategic direction. 
 The inclusion of the United Kingdom, Italy, Iceland, and Norway in NATO granted 
the U.S. the basing rights it needed to utterly dominate the North Atlantic and the 
Mediterranean – the two bodies of water that would be required for any 
theoretical European resurgence. The one meaningful European attempt to 
challenge the new reality – the Anglo-French Sinai campaign of 1956 – cemented 
the downfall of the European navies. Both London and Paris discovered that they 
now lacked the power to hold naval policies independently of Washington. 
 The seizure of Japan's Pacific empire granted the Americans basing access in 
the Pacific; sufficient access to allow complete American naval dominance of the 
north and central portions of that ocean. 
 A formal alliance with Australia and New Zealand extended American naval 
hegemony to the southern Pacific in 1951. 
 A 1952 security treaty placed a rehabilitated Japan – and its navy – firmly under 
the American security umbrella. 
 
Shorn of both independent economic vitality at home and strong independent naval 
presences beyond their home waters, all of the European empires quickly collapsed. 
Within a few decades of World War II's end, nearly every piece of the once globe-
spanning European empires had achieved independence. 
There is another secret to American success – both in controlling the oceans and 
taking advantage of European failures – that lies in an often-misunderstood 
economic structure of the Bretton Woods system. Even before World War II ended, 
the U.S. had leveraged its position as the largest economy and military to convince 
all of the Western allies – most of whose governments were in exile at the time – to 
sign the Bretton Woods accord. The states committed to the formation of the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, to assist with the expected post-
war reconstruction. Considering the general destitution of Western Europe at the 
time, this, in essence, was a U.S. commitment to finance that reconstruction. 
Because of this, the U.S. dollar was the obvious and only choice to serve as the 
global currency. 
But the Bretton Woods system was about more than currency regimes and 
international institutions; its deeper purpose lay in two other features that are often 
overlooked. It stipulated that the U.S. would open its markets to participating states' 
exports while not requiring reciprocal access to its own. In exchange, participating 
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states would grant the U.S. deference in the crafting of security policy. NATO quickly 
emerged as the organization through which this policy was pursued. 
From the point of view of the non-American founders of the Bretton Woods system, 
this was an excellent deal. Self-funded reconstruction was out of the question. The 
bombing campaigns required to defeat the Nazis leveled most of Western Europe's 
infrastructure and industrial capacity. Even in those few parts of the United Kingdom 
that emerged unscathed, the state labored under a debt that would require decades 
of economic growth to recover from. 
It was not so much that access to the American market would help regenerate 
Europe's fortunes as it was that the American market was the only market at the 
war's end. And since all exports from Bretton Woods states (with the exception of 
some Canadian exports) to the U.S. had to travel by water, and since the U.S. Navy 
was the only institution that could guarantee the safety of those exports, adopting 
security policies unfriendly to Washington was simply seen as a nonstarter. By the 
mid-1950s, the Bretton Woods system had been expanded to the defeated Axis 
powers as well as South Korea and Taiwan. It soon became the basis of the global 
trading network, first being incorporated into the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade and in time being transformed into the World Trade Organization. With a 
single policy, the Americans had not only fused their economic and military policies 
into a single robust system but had also firmly established that American dominance 
of the seas and the global economic system would be in the interest of all major 
economies with the exception of the Soviet Union.15 
Figure 5. American global supremacy (by Brzezinski) 
 
 
 
4.3 The contemporary geopolitical fault lines  
In his famous book, The Next Hundred Years, Friedman discussed the contemporary 
geopolitical fault lines. There are five areas in the world right now that are viable 
candidates for being geopolitical fault lines.  
First, there is the all-important Pacific Basin. The U.S. Navy dominates the Pacific. 
The Asian rim of the Pacific consists entirely of trading countries dependent on 
                                                     
15  Russia finally joined the World Trade Organization in 2012. 
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access to the high seas, which are therefore dependent on the U.S. Two of them – 
China and Japan – are major powers that could potentially challenge the U.S. 
hegemony. From 1941 to 1945 the U.S. and Japan fought over the Pacific Basin, 
and control of it remains a potential issue today. Today we see a careful American 
re-balance with Asia.   
Second, we must consider the future of Eurasia after the fall of the Soviet Union. 
Since 1991, the region has fragmented and decayed. The successor state to the 
Soviet Union, Russia, is emerging from this period with renewed self-confidence. Yet 
Russia is also in an untenable geopolitical position. Unless Russia exerts itself to 
create a sphere of influence, the Russian Federation could itself fragment. On the 
other hand, creating that sphere of influence could generate conflict with the U.S. 
and Europe. As seen today, the crisis in Ukraine tells the story. 
Third, there is continuing doubt about the ultimate framework of Europe. For five 
centuries Europe has been an arena of constant warfare. For the last sixty years it 
has been either occupied or trying to craft a federation that would make the return of 
war impossible. Europe may yet have to deal with the resurgence of Russia, the 
bullying of the U.S., or internal tensions. The door is certainly not closed on conflict. 
Fourth, there is the Islamic world. It is not instability that is troubling but the 
emergence of a nation-state that, regardless of ideology, might form the basis of a 
coalition. Historically, Turkey has been the most successful center of power in the 
Muslim world. Turkey is also a dynamic and rapidly modernizing country. What is its 
future, and what is the future of other Muslim nation-states? The Middle East may 
become the Balkans of today. Jihadism, at the heart of the Islamic world, is 
complicating assessments. At its heart, the battle against jihadism is essentially an 
ideological battle.  
Fifth, Friedman identifies the question of Mexican–American relations. Normally, the 
status of Mexico would not rise to the level of being a global fault line, but its location 
in North America makes it important beyond its obvious power. As the country with 
the fifteenth highest GDP in the world, it should not be underestimated on its own 
merits. Mexico has deep and historical issues with the U.S., and social forces may 
arise over the next century that cannot be controlled by either government. 
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5 Economy as a premise for U.S. grand strategy 
5.1 About U.S. economic policy goals  
The core national interests of the U.S. are closely connected to economy. 
Constitutional values support liberal economic policies. The expansion of free world 
trade has a geopolitical dimension. The U.S. has actively shaped the world economy 
and continues to do so.  
It is naturally the economic policy goal of every nation to offer prosperity for its 
citizens, especially in democratically governed states. The U.S. is striving for a high 
GDP per capita, and here it has succeeded well.  
Economic well-being is a premise for a nation to project power. To become a leading 
nation requires that one also has at least one of the highest GDP shares. As figure 6 
illustrates, the U.S. has led this game until recently but is now losing ground to 
China. 
Promoting free world trade is a necessity to make the world a safer place for 
democracy (Wilson). Ultimately this will lead to a diminishing U.S. GDP share. This 
equation tells that the task embedded to shaping a liberal world order is also a 
gamble; a delicate balancing act. To be able to maintain its primacy and promote the 
strategic vision presented by Brzezinski, GDP share is a priority. There is a limited 
window of opportunity for the U.S. The exceptional 50 percent post-war GDP share 
is gone, but to maintain a high enough GDP share for long enough is crucial. And 
because GDP is all about value creation and channeling value to one’s national 
economy, the way this is done shapes economic policies. 
Figure 6. A history of world GDP. The percentage of the total for the major states. 
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Figure 7. The projected changes of the GDP of the major powers 
 
 
Source:  http://www.oecd.org/eco/outlook/2060policynote.pdf 
PPP=Purchase power Parity 
 
5.2 The evolution of U.S. economic policies 
Historically, the evolution of U.S. economic policy follows a certain pattern. From the 
beginning, it has an expansionist trend, it is linked to the larger policy framework, 
and it seems to reconfigure itself according to circumstances, reflecting political and 
technological changes. There is also a continuous seeking of balance between 
domestic and external priorities. The following intends to highlight some of the main 
aspects and historical changes. It is a story of free market capitalism that does not 
shy from putting its principles to one side when a bigger cause requires it. It is also 
about harnessing national resources in a determined and creative way. 
From independence to expansion 
The U.S. Constitution established that the entire nation was a unified, common 
market, with no internal tariffs or taxes on interstate commerce. The extent of federal 
power was much debated, with Alexander Hamilton taking a very broad view as the 
first Secretary of the Treasury during the presidential administration of George 
Washington. Hamilton successfully argued for the concept of ‘implied powers,’ 
whereby the federal government was authorized by the Constitution to create 
anything necessary to support its contents. The so-called Commerce Clause of the 
Constitution, for example, gives the federal government the power to regulate trade 
between states. 
Hamilton succeeded in building strong national credit based on taking over the state 
debts and bundling them with the old national debt into new securities sold to the 
wealthy. They in turn now had an interest in keeping the new government solvent. 
Hamilton funded the debt with tariffs on imported goods and a highly controversial 
tax on whiskey. Hamilton believed the U.S. should pursue economic growth through 
diversified shipping, manufacturing, and banking. He sought and achieved 
Congressional authority to create the First Bank of the United States in 1791. The 
charter lasted until 1811. 
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During its first decades the new nation expanded geographically and economically. 
The thirteen colonies become colonizers. New markets were consolidated for 
agricultural surplus. The Erie Canal was the first transportation route towards to west 
connecting New York to the Great Lakes and thus paving way for the City of New 
York to become the most important port and a financial center. The establishment of 
the federal government made it possible to direct the nation’s energies from internal 
struggle to an increasing economic, and thus also a political, expansion. 
Regarding early technologies, the steel industry was important. In producing steel 
form iron, the new Bessemer process became important. Railroads knitted the new 
states together. Steel enabled the economic expansion to be coupled with the 
gradually expanding sea power. 
Science already came to play an important role during the early days. The National 
Academy of Sciences was founded by President Lincoln in 1963. The relationship 
between the government and the big steel companies, Bethlehem Steel and U.S. 
Steel, became the bedrock of the economy. The steel industry’s relationship with the 
navy became essential in creating the first trust networks, which later became a hot 
policy topic. Overall, the Civil War demanded massive mobilization efforts for the first 
time, this becoming an important capability during the following century. 
The financial market witnessed several unstable periods and finally the panic of 1893 
ignited the establishment of the Federal Reserve System (FED).  
The Progressive Era – expansion continues overseas 
To understand the current U.S. economy and society, perhaps the most defining 
period historically was the Progressive Era that lasted from about 1896 to 1932. It 
represented the fourth of the five U.S. party systems. The central domestic economic 
issues concerned government regulation of railroads and large corporations (‘trusts’), 
the money issue (gold versus silver), the protective tariff, the role of labor unions, 
child labor, and the need for a new banking system.  
On a larger policy arena, it also dealt with corruption in party politics, primary 
elections, the direct election of senators, racial segregation, efficiency in 
government, women's suffrage, and the control of immigration. Foreign policy 
centered on the 1898 Spanish–American War, Imperialism, the Mexican Revolution, 
World War I, and the creation of the League of Nations. 
The great enablers were the 1913 FED and the institution of the federal income tax. 
As a political compromise, the FED became a semi-governmental institution with a 
decentralized structure comprising of twelve regional Federal Reserve Banks. 
Federal income tax laid the ground for an effective mobilization policy.   
Initially the naval strategy relied on fortifications in the Atlantic ports. With the 1899 
annexation of the Philippines, responsibilities extended to the Pacific. The U.S. 
industrial capabilities reached a point where America could shift its strategic defense 
doctrine from a reliance on coastal defense to an offensive sea control doctrine 
provided by its own battle fleet. This required peacetime expenditure, a mobilized 
industrial base, and broad public support. 
Antitrust sentiments initially grew during the Progressive Era. However, when 
America entered the World War I, the national economy reverted to the aspects of 
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centralized financial and industrial power that had been objectionable in the internal 
discussions.  
When the war ended, the European powers were prostrate. The Allies presented the 
Germans with a bill of 32 billion USD for war reparations. The British had to liquidate 
their overseas investments.  
World War I drew the U.S. into European entanglements and fueled an 
expansionism no longer bounded by America’s continental coasts and two great 
oceans. Military resource-building, together with war planning by presidential power, 
were now needed. 
The Navy General Board was the first institutional peacetime body to plan for war. 
The Preparedness Movement stressed military readiness. It required peacetime 
expansion, a mobilized industry, and public support. 
Technology and science become more important. A turning point was the sinking of 
the passenger ship Lucitania by a German U-boat in 1915. New institutions grew. 
The establishment of the Naval Consulting Board, the National Advisory Board for 
Aeronautics and the National Research Council represented the first steps in the 
American march toward modern, government-sponsored research – led by 
engineers, industrialists, and scientists. Also the establishment of the U.S. Chamber 
of Commerce, the Council of National Defense (in 1916), and the War Industries 
Board took place during this period.  
The national economic policy forged government-led industrial partnership for war 
mobilization, ensuring the global post-war expansion of American corporations. The 
invention process became important, leading to the invention of the combustion 
engine for example. 
As a result, U.S. entanglement with Europe increased. The League of Nations was 
established and the techno-industrial base strengthened. In 1918 the U.S. became 
the world financial center. Wall Street and the U.S. financers now recognized an 
expansive potential to capitalize the reconstruction of Europe. 
The GDP doubled, the population migrated to cities, and industrialization 
accelerated. Agriculture transformed from family farms to agribusiness and mass 
production took place. The U.S. now had what it required to restore the economic 
stability and employment on both sides of the Atlantic.  
The Great Depression and World War II – forming a global superpower 
The 1929 Wall Street Crash led to the shattering of world trade. Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt was elected president in 1932. He relied on a highly eclectic group of 
advisors who patched together many programs into something known as the New 
Deal, which increased the role of the federal government. 
In the midst of the Great Depression America turned inward. There was a period of 
isolationism in the face of the rising Nazism. Despite isolationism, the interwar 
mobilization continued. Once war came, military–industrial relations would be better 
than in World War I, thanks to the previous efforts and planning. 
When World War II broke out, the U.S. was able to join in by mobilizing its industrial 
capabilities. Roosevelt created a new War Production Board in 1942. Vannevar Bush 
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was given the authority to use presidential resources and to lead the research and 
development under the White House’s Office of Scientific Research and 
Development. The Manhattan Project was, however, buried in the army budget, 
becoming the nation’s first ‘black’ program.  
Bush led the government sponsored National Defense Research Committee 
(NDRC). Presidential funds were used without congressional oversight and the 
NDRC reported directly to the president. The NDRC was later absorbed by the White 
House’s OSRD. Policy-making was fed by massive funding and innovation 
partnerships with industrial and university researchers and labs flourished. The era 
saw the birth of radar, radio-controlled fuzes, missiles, penicillin, mass production, 
and the atomic bomb. The role of the army as a whole now became more important 
than that of the navy.   
Once the end of war was in sight, there was a growing need for a peacetime national 
strategy. The result was a formalized peacetime preparedness alliance of the 
government, science, industry, academia, and the military. What emerged was 
a national security establishment that lasted through to the end of Cold War. 
The Navy Department, under Secretary James Forestall and his Wall Street 
colleague Ferdinand Eberstadt, led the thinking. They saw in a new era with no 
distinction between war and peace. The new plan saw that business could 
dominate national security and recommended a formal co-operation between the 
state and major economic power blocks. This idea of continuous economic 
warfare was earlier presented by the coming post-war president Dwight D. 
Eisenhower in 1930.  
In 1941 the White House’s Office of Production Management and Lend-Lease 
program for the Allies provided material support to Britain and France and formed 
the basis for the Bretton Woods Agreements and the Marshall Plan. Defense orders 
from heavy industry became the arsenal for democracy. During the war, the world 
new economic architecture was already considered. The Bretton Woods institutions, 
the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, GATT, and the Bank of International 
Settlements were to become the key organizations, together with NATO. The world 
economy was bound to the dollar.  
The Cold War era – a bipolar world 
Eberstadt’s plan became the basis for the National Security Act of 1947. This 
milestone created the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, 
and the National Security Resource Board.  
However, the Cold War interrupted the full implementation of the Bretton Woods 
policies. The Soviet Union became a geostrategic adversary and the containment 
policy had to be adopted. The world became bipolar.  
In sum, the mortal urgency of the World War II atomic age and Cold War 
sharpened the concept of the U.S. techno-industrial base and became a 
perpetual peacetime mobilization. Throughout the Cold War, the Pentagon military 
acquisitions would be the government driver for science and technology, innovation, 
and the government. It created a market for aerospace, electronics, and nuclear 
weapons. This was justified by the market’s capability to ‘spin off’ a succession of 
technologies in the commercial sector.  
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As was the case after World War I, now the investment banks and capital intensive 
firms, labor, and agribusiness also saw a prostrate Europe and an opportunity for 
expansion. The Marshall Plan for European reconstruction was an internationalist 
project. The Marshall Plan was later transformed into the OEEC and later the OECD, 
serving the ideas of economic development. 
The European integration could have institutionalized under the OEEC or the Council 
of Europe. However, under strong influence by the U.S. and affected by the internal 
European politics, it gradually grew out from the European Coal and Steel 
Community.16  
Policy encouraged overseas foreign investments promoting industrial and economic 
expansionism. Zbigniew Brzezinski expressed his theory of international production 
as a counterpart to international trade as early as 1970. Economists have only 
recently been shaken to actively analyze the functioning of global value chains and 
their dramatic and crucial effects on national economies. Not surprisingly, if we study 
the balance of payment sheets, we realize that the U.S. income from Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) usually exceeds that of foreign FDI payments from the U.S.  
The guns and butter approach of Eisenhower’s strategist C. D. Jackson took the 
stance that U.S. policy should force the Soviets to spend money on arms in order to 
prevent Soviet expansionism.   
When Reagan came to power in 1981, the focus of the U.S. turned more closely on 
the Soviet Union. Reagan agreed with Brzezinski: the Soviet system was going 
bankrupt. It was the paradigm shift in the form of Strategic Defense Initiative (aka 
Star Wars) that paved the way for the increased economic stress that led to the 
collapse of the Soviet Union.  
George H. W. Bush’s election marked the final days of the Soviet Union. Mikhail 
Gorbachev’s speech at the UN stated that the world economy is becoming a single 
organism. George Shultz realized that this was a speech born from weakness and 
that the only Soviet strategic asset would to be its strategic weapons. Finally, the 
U.S. achieved its policy goals of 1947.  
The Post–Cold War era – the first global hegemony 
After the Soviet collapse new nation states emerged and many of them joined the 
western political and economic alliances, especially NATO and the EU.   
Until the end of the Cold War, it was the military–industrial complex that fed the rest 
of the economy with economic spin-offs. Today, the civilian ICT base is nourishing 
                                                     
16  The Birth of the European Union. 
http://arrow.dit.ie/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1009&context=aaschlawart  p. 57: The U.S. pressured 
France to come up with a supranational solution to the German problem. In October 1949, then 
Secretary of State Dean Acheson met in Washington, D.C. with "the more important American 
Ambassadors in Western Europe," and pressed for French action towards European integration. He 
gave them a letter specifying what he wanted them to do. "I have in mind," he wrote, "a timetable for 
the creation of supra-national institutions, operating on a less than unanimity basis for dealing with 
specific, economic, social and perhaps other problems." According to historian Desmond Dinan, 
"what the Americans really wanted was what eventually happened in Europe not in 1952 but in 
1992: a single market involving the free movement of goods, services and capital." What the U.S. 
suggested was the type of strong federal system usually termed supranationalism. "To locate deep 
and abiding enthusiasm for the supranational principle, one must turn to the United States," 
according to British historian John Gillingham.  
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the economy as well as military, defense, and intelligence. Even space, an 
increasingly important domain of military strategies, is being explored by private 
enterprises. The possibility to extend surveillance based in information technology 
has created a new global environment where national intelligence authorities 
compete in cyberspace. This new economic-technological dimension is affecting the 
world politically, militarily, and economically.  
Alan Greenspan became the chair of the Federal Reserve in 1987. What followed 
were policies of market interventions in addition to supervising and regulating banks, 
implementing monetary policy, and maintaining a strong official payment system. 
This finally marked the full implementation of the Breton Woods principles. 
In 1989 the Bush team made Jim Baker the Secretary of State. This marked a 
policy shift from the Pentagon to the Treasury and Federal Reserve. The 
techno-industrial base was no longer the core. The monetary policy was 
consulted by a community associated with financial services. 
The Clinton administration put a final end to the U.S. Cold War techno-industrial 
policy. Morton17 recalls the memoirs of Robert Rubin, the 2003 co-chairman of 
Goldman Sachs during the Clinton era, where he stated that his role as Clinton’s 
Secretary of the Treasury was all about creating a global financial market – a policy 
moving from containment towards an enlargement of market democracies. As 
an equivalent to the post World War II Marshall Plan aid, now Eastern Europe and 
former Soviet Republics were developed. 
Corporations made competitive assessments based on an increasing capability to 
use IT to develop and perfect algorithms for return on investment. Institutional 
investors got into manufacturing company boards and extended financing operations 
(GE’s GE Capital, etc.). 
Globalization became the globalization of financial markets. With floating currencies, 
the value of money was about projected future value. The entailed risks had to be 
hedged. So derivatives, credit fault swaps, and other financial instruments also 
became vehicles for speculation. Loyalty was to come into question in shadow 
banking. 
When Greenspan took office, the U.S. had no banks in the world top ten. The still 
controversial repeal of the 1933 Glass-Steagull Act in the 1999 Financial Services 
Modernization Act – eliminating the barriers to commercial banking, insurance, 
securities, and mortgages – was the final enabler for Greenspan’s superbanking 
competitive strategy. In 2003 the U.S. had three banks in the top ten. Citigroup stood 
at number one, then the Bank of America, and JPMorgan Chase. 
The numbers tell the story. In 1950, manufacturing represented 29.3 percent of 
GDP, whereas in 2005 it was just 12 percent. In the same years, finance 
represented 10.9 percent and 20.4 percent respectively. When looking company 
profits, the development is still clearer. In 2005 finance contributed 40 to 50 percent 
of all corporate profits. 
                                                     
17  See Economic Security, Neglected Dimension of National Security (ed. Sheila R. Ronis): John F. 
Morton’s chapter, ‘Toward a Premise for Grand Strategy’. I am mostly thankful to John. F. Morton for 
the many lessons learned from him.  
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Once the industrial policy debates had been over ‘picking winners and losers,’ in the 
first decade of the 21st century and today, the debate is about being ‘too big to fail.’ 
The big dog ‘inside the Beltway’ is Goldman Sachs, no longer companies like 
Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, or General Dynamics.  
After 9/11 the Bush strategy was, some would say, about resource strategy. But 
Morton asks if it was, at bottom, a strategy to preserve the dollar as the international 
reserve currency. For Obama the strategic goal has remained the same.  
The hot issues and the main pillars of U.S. strength today 
The imbalance of the U.S. economy with the rest of the world causes regular worry. 
This is linked to the accumulating of national debt. The U.S. government debt is at 
the moment about hundred percent of GDP, traditionally a critical level for an 
average national economy. Solving this problem is mainly a political one. 
Figure 8. The U.S. Government debt to GDP  
 
 
 
The world has got accustomed to the U.S. structural current account deficit. Whether 
this is critical or not seems to divide opinions. Overall, the biggest portion of the U.S. 
debt is owned by the domestic public. China’s role, is limited.   
Figure 9. The current account balance by country 
 
 
 
The size of China's economy surpassed that of the U.S. in 2014 using purchasing 
power parity metrics. But the yuan still only has about a 2.2 percent share of 
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international payments; it has a long way to go before it truly begins to challenge the 
U.S. dollar's 44.6 percent share. Also, the Chinese currency is not fully convertible, 
which is a major requirement for any possible reserve currency. The final reason we 
have not yet seen a Bretton Woods moment between the U.S. and China is that we 
have not seen a Lend-Lease deal. The U.S. maintains its control of the world’s sea 
lanes and thus has the ultimate decision-making power over global trade. Without 
the onset of a massive disruption, this state of affairs is unlikely to change anytime 
soon. 
The vehicle that drives the rise and fall of empires rests on big wheels, and it takes a 
strong force applied over an extended period of time before an entire revolution can 
take place. The agreements struck during World War II marked the culmination of a 
long process in which the U.S. rose and Britain weakened. China has indeed 
undergone a remarkable transformation over the past three decades, but it is not yet 
in a position to effectively challenge the pillars upon which the U.S.'s global 
hegemony rests. 
The U.S. military is one of the largest militaries in terms of its number of personnel. It 
draws its manpower from a large pool of paid volunteers, although conscription has 
been used in the past at various times of both war and peace. As of 2013, the U.S. 
spends about $554.2 billion annually to fund its military forces, and appropriates 
approximately $88.5 billion to fund Overseas Contingency Operations. Put together, 
the U.S. constitutes roughly 39 percent of the world’s military expenditure. The U.S. 
Armed Forces has significant capabilities in both defense and power projection 
thanks to its advanced and powerful equipment and its widespread deployment of 
force around the world. This power is projected globally in all main operational fields; 
sea, air, land, space, and cyberspace.  
Within sea power alone, the U.S. lead is staggering. The U.S. Navy operates 11 
large aircraft carriers, all nuclear powered: no other country has even one. It has 57 
nuclear-powered attack and cruise missile submarines – again, more than the rest of 
the world combined. Seventy-nine Aegis-equipped surface combatants carry roughly 
8 000 vertical-launch missile cells, outmatching the next 20 largest navies. The U.S. 
Marine Corps alone is larger and more capable than the ground and air forces of all 
but few nations. It has a strong military capacity for amphibious shore control.  
There is still a powerful Pentagon sponsored industrial base. Of all the world’s 
military spending, the U.S. represents almost one half while the EU member states 
represent about one quarter. And compared to Europe for example, the R&D share 
of all military costs in the U.S. is on a much higher level. The new offset strategy 
initiated by the Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel strives for the modernization of 
the U.S. conventional armed forces.18 Technology is one force multiplier available to 
counter the quantitative benefits the Eurasian powers have.  
Concerning manufacturing in general, although its share of total GDP has gradually 
declined, in the long run the value added has been on the rise. However, the high 
U.S. GDP per capita is mainly explainable by the developed service economy 
representing some 80 percent of its GDP. McKinsey, for example, estimates that the 
gap between Europe and the U.S. on GDP per capita is just due the more advanced 
U.S. service economy. 
                                                     
18  See for example Robert Martinage, Toward a new Offset Strategy, 2014. 
      http://csbaonline.org/publications/2014/10/toward-a-new-offset-strategy-exploiting-u-s-long-term-
advantages-to-restore-u-s-global-power-projection-capability/ 
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One of the great ironies has been the U.S. political dependency on the oil-producing 
Middle-Eastern countries. The newly recognized unconventional oil and shale gas 
reserves seem to be changing the landscape. However, the energy profile for source 
and use will change drastically over the next 40 years. The next 20 years are the 
most critical for the U.S. to position itself with assured and secure forms of energy. 
As new technologies mature, the U.S. energy strategy will balance many questions. 
Among other factors, energy policy has geopolitical implications and U.S. interests 
and those of its allies will be prioritized.19 
5.3 The U.S. National Innovation System  
Modern economic competitiveness policy is mainly about innovation policy. To 
understand the U.S. National Innovation System,20 one has to understand that a 
national innovation system is ‘the network of institutions in the public and private 
sectors whose activities and interactions initiate, import, modify and diffuse new 
technologies (and solutions).’ To better understand the systemic whole, the business 
environment, the regulatory framework, and innovation system should be looked at 
together. The innovation system matters because a nation’s innovation success 
depends on this system working effectively and synergistically. And in the case of 
the U.S., it is not a separate phenomenon but one affected by everything that was 
described earlier. 
We may first look at the business environment. When it comes to managerial 
talent, the U.S. is the world leader. It has developed this discipline from the 1950s 
and perfected it through its extensive system of business schools. Taking into 
account the role the U.S. plays in world politics, this is no wonder. Running the world 
creates talent that is applicable to military, business, etcetera. Today this talent is 
linked to a high ICT adoption within U.S. firms. There is a clear synergy between 
politics, military, and business.  
Venture and risk capital activity is high and the nation analyzes and funds investment 
functions actively. Although these activities are regionally very concentrated, each 
state has its own actors. There is a general trend of high customer demand. Risk 
taking and entrepreneurship are rewarded and the attitude toward science and 
technology is supportive. There is also a collaborative culture and willingness to 
invest in the future, although recent trends indicate at least a temporary decline. 
Regarding the trade, tax, and regulatory environment, the U.S. has generally 
embraced market competition. This has especially put an emphasis on maximizing 
consumer welfare. One can contrast this with the EU for example, which seems to 
embrace more producer welfare. Regarding the antitrust policies the debate is 
ongoing as to whether it has been too stringent and thus limited the emergence of 
the scaling required to win in global competition. It is not only relatively easy to start 
a new business, but it is also easy (at least in the non-unionized and non-
governmental sectors) to close and downsize businesses. This is important because 
it lowers the burden of entrepreneurship and contrasts to the culture in Europe.  
                                                     
19  See, for example, the articles of Louis J. Infante and Keith W. Cooley in Economic Security: 
Neglected Dimension of National Security.  
20  Robert D. Atkinson. Understanding the U.S. National Innovation System.  Information Technology 
and Innovation Fund, 2014.  http://www.itif.org/publications/2014/06/30/understanding-us-national-
innovation-system 
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The stability of U.S. macroeconomic policy relies on monetary policy rather than 
fiscal policy to adjust the cyclical growth rate. Tax neutrality has been valued but 
sometimes the policy is interventionist for preferred reasons (R&D, growth), 
sometimes also because of special interests. The corporate tax rate is generally 
high. Trade policy is based on the belief that nations will reveal their comparative 
advantage and that an open market-based trading system enables nations to 
achieve that advantage to benefit customers. The U.S. system of intellectual 
property has its roots in the U.S. Constitution by providing investors with the limited 
but exclusive right to their discoveries. By and large, the government itself does not 
get involved in picking particular industry standards, which are coordinated by the 
American National Standards Institute.  
Regarding the Innovation Policy Environment itself, the support for research and 
technology is based on two fundamental aspects. These are the 1) support for 
mission-oriented research (defense, health, and energy) in federal laboratories and 
2) support for basic curiosity-directed research through university funding. In 2013, 
the federal government financed approximately $140 billion of R&D activity. Relative 
to private R&D funding trends, federal support for R&D has fallen substantially.  
There are some 80 to 100 government research laboratories, some government 
operated, some contractor based. University research is supported through a 
number of agencies including Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of 
Education and the National Institutes of Health. Technology transfer systems have 
been actively developed. The Bayh-Dole Act allowed universities to retain the IP 
rights, giving them more incentives to commercialize research. The U.S. does not 
generally support firm level R&D unless it is related to achieving a core mission, 
especially one in defense. However, there are few recent exceptions. In 1981 a tax 
credit system was introduced. Sometimes targeted R&D support has been approved, 
the semiconductor industry being an example. President Obama’s National Network 
for Manufacturing Innovation is modeled to copy the German Fraunhofer model but 
is limited in scale, at least for the time being.21 
Innovation clusters (especially the DOD Silicon Valley) have been recognized by the 
government since 1990, with Professor Michael Porter popularizing the concept. The 
collaboration between industries and research institutes are encouraged. Foreign 
direct investment is encouraged in order to support technology transfer. President 
Obama’s SelectUSA is one of the few FDI attracting schemes on a federal level. 
Generally there are few limits on exporting. Within the Commerce Department, the 
Bureau of Industry and Security oversees the transfer of certain sensitive 
technologies. Locally, technology diffusion and adoption are encouraged by the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology.  
The U.S. K-12 education system is largely operated on a state and local level. The 
American higher education system is diverse and distributed in nature. Skills training 
is largely seen as a private sector responsibility but there is some federal role the 
Department of Labor in helping disadvantaged individuals to obtain skills. More than 
                                                     
21   The National Network for Manufacturing Innovation (NNMI) is a proposed network of research 
institutes in the U.S. that will focus on developing and commercializing manufacturing technologies 
through public-private partnerships between U.S. industry, universities, and federal government 
agencies. The NNMI will consist of up to 45 Institutes for Manufacturing Innovation (IMIs), each with 
a unique research concentration that will serve as regional manufacturing innovation hubs. A pilot 
institute was established in Youngstown, Ohio, in August 2012. Three additional IMIs were 
announced in May 2013. 
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many other nations, the U.S. has relied on high-skill immigrants to support its 
innovation system.    
Globalization has affected the social fabric. The generally dynamic labor market has 
coped pretty well. However, recently the increasing polarization in the labor market 
has been noticed by both main parties in the U.S. The disagreement is over the 
means to solve the problem.  
6 Finland and its economic competitiveness 
In retrospect, one could argue that there seems to be a historical process in 
progress. However, for those who were engaged in events, it often seemed at the 
times anything but clear. Today again, clear geopolitical fault lines emerge. But the 
process seems to go forwards. Two big means carry it forwards, namely war and 
commerce. We should work toward commerce taking the upper hand. 
Finland shares the core republican values with the U.S. and has benefited greatly 
from the current world order. Without free world trade our economic and political 
standing would be very different. Finland has every reason to wish that this order 
remains and that democratic and rules-based institutions will widen.  
What lessons then, can be drawn from the above? Overall, Finland (including the 
MEE), has to (and will have to) assess its strategies according the changing 
environment. Geopolitically, Finland’s location is unique. Although a small national 
economy, understanding the world around might pave the way for new policy 
approaches.  
6.1 MEE-specific policy lessons  
There are some lessons that the MEE could learn from the U.S. grand strategy 
search. 
1. The first lesson is that we should follow more carefully the development of U.S. 
economic policies. And the rationale for its economic policy shifts is linked to the 
wider view.   
 
2. Finland could increase foresight work with the U.S. For example, the next 20 
years are crucial for the development of future energy systems. Technologies are 
being developed on a wide range of alternatives but at the moment no one 
knows all the answers of tomorrow’s solutions. Short-sighted decisions today will 
be expensive. The same holds on many other fields, including the IT-sector. 
 
3. Regarding Finnish innovation policies, we should position our own policies 
considering those of the global leaders. We cannot copy systems but we also 
cannot have an innovation system that does not take into account that of the 
leading systems. Therefore, monitoring closely the U.S. and other innovation 
systems is the key to our own success. We must understand how value creation 
takes place in the global economy and how we as a national economy can do it 
in a resilient way. From the U.S. perspective the post Cold War approach has 
changed. How should we calibrate? It is increasingly from financial services that 
the U.S. as a national economy makes its revenue. We should make sure that 
we have our own platform solutions (Google, etc.) that channel revenue to our 
economy.   
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4. The U.S. led political landscape is again on the move. Currently the TPP and 
TTIP negotiations are at a critical junction. The TTIP will likely materialize in 
some form and, once it arrives, it will become a living agreement. This will then 
initiate a process in which industrial standards gradually integrate. It is therefore 
important for Finland to closely monitor and influence issues important for 
Finland whenever possible, at the earliest possible moment. This is especially 
true in the strategic growth areas, digitalization, bioeconomy, cleantech, the 
health sector, service economy, etc. 
 
5. Finnish international orientation takes place very much within the EU framework, 
this being a natural framework for us. To see the EU and the U.S. as economic 
competitors is understandable. However, this tendency should be rethought and 
a new more balanced and updated attitude should be adopted. European 
integration is a U.S. initiated process. European integration is for the European 
states but, ultimately, Europe can only be understood by looking both east and 
west. For this reason, we should not look at, for example, EU industrial policies in 
isolation of the wider picture.  
 
6. Regarding our strategic growth areas, the most natural partners in the U.S. are 
found at a state and local level. Federal level co-ordination is possible. Co-
operation should be increased. Bioeconomy and cleantech clusters should be 
identified and explored. 
 
7. A special focus should be paid to digitalization. Digitalization links to the core 
national interests of the U.S. It crosses defense, economy, intelligence, etc. As a 
phenomenon, it is young and rapidly developing. An open internet and the free 
flow of information is a strategic interest of the U.S. while at the same time it is 
linked to security aspects. According to a Council on Foreign Relations study for 
example, the U.S. should identify partners among governments to shape and 
build cyberspace. Finland could benefit from deeper co-operation.22 
 
8. The notion of national comparative advantage is on a move. The spillover effects 
of national innovation policies easily spread globally. Therefore we have to 
strategically rethink the best ways for a small national economy to gain the 
effects we set as a target for innovation policies. One specific area in which to 
learn from the U.S. is that of managerial capabilities.  
 
9. As the TTIP will ultimately shape the regulatory framework, one area to look 
closely is the service sector. As mentioned in our service-economy report, we will 
face increasing competition where, due to the nature of digitalization, the ‘winner 
is increasingly taking all’. And it is especially the financial sector that should be 
looked at carefully. It is within U.S. strategic thinking to manage the world’s 
financial market and this will increase competition soon after the regulatory 
framework allows it. A thorough analysis regarding European and Finnish finance 
and other service sectors should be deepened to understand the potential 
impacts. 
 
                                                     
22  See for example Defending an Open, Global, Secure, and Resilient Internet. Council on Foreign 
Relations, 2014. John D. Negroponte, McLarty Associates, and Samuel J. Palmisano. 
http://www.cfr.org/cybersecurity/defending-open-global-secure-resilient-internet/p30836 
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10. The U.S. has the most developed venture and risk capital markets. A more 
strategic approach could be considered.  
 
11. Finland should pay more attention to the huge size of the U.S. domestic market. 
Especially now, when the devaluation of euro has improved our domestic cost-
competitiveness, the timing is right for targeted marketing. 
 
12. The U.S. economy is more dynamic, although egalitarianism is not valued as 
much as here. There is a lot to learn from its dynamism.  
 
6.2 The wider framework 
After having been under Swedish rule for six centuries, Finland became an 
autonomous part of the Russian Empire in 1809. The struggle for independence bore 
fruit and Finland gained its independence in 1917. Ethnic, cultural and religious 
factors drove nation building. Ideological struggle with the emerging new ideology, 
namely Marxism-Leninism, that took root in the eastern neighbor, the Soviet Union, 
led to internal division and to a bitter civil war. As a result, democratic representation 
and a republican form of government triumphed. 
World War II unified the nation. World War II put us between a rock and a hard 
place. After the Winter War, the Moscow Peace Treaty was not truly about peace. 
Practically attacked by the communist Soviet Union, Finland was besieged and 
forced to ally with Nazi Germany in the Continuation War. According to the Finnish 
interpretation, the war with Germany was a separate war. Finland had to choose 
from two bad choices and two alien ideologies.  
The lesson could not be clearer. Finland must promote liberal democracy within its 
vicinity. It must promote a world order where disputes are settled peacefully, 
according to mutually agreed rules. Borders should not be redrawn by arms.  
Geopolitically, Finland faces the Eurasian fault line. It also faces the question of the 
future of European integration.  
The future of Europe 
European integration is crucial for Finland’s success. European integration has been, 
as a whole, a success story. It is within the core national interests of both Finland 
and the U.S. to promote European stability and democratic integration.   
European integration was originally a U.S. initiative and was formed to become an 
economic bulwark against the communist Soviet Union. After the Cold War, it 
became possible to extend the liberal democratic model eastward. This it is still the 
goal. 
When thinking of the future of European integration, this should be kept in mind. It is 
important to understand that Europe’s future is linked to both the U.S. and the 
Eurasian question. France and Germany, the most important European powers, 
need assistance in shaping the European future.  
The institutional framework of the EU is complex. It needs a lot of bureaucratic work 
to understand it, not to speak about running the system. Complex systems are 
ineffective. For example, the euro area was created without centralized monetary 
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policy relying on centralized fiscal policy. From the beginning, the rational was that 
difficulties, when they come, will forcefully push integration further. 
The experience shows that what is economically possible may become politically 
difficult. Politically a European federal system seems impossible, so divergent are 
the national interests of European powers. The complexity of the system will 
consume energy and resources. The question regarding the future of integration is 
not solved. 
My understanding is that the future of the system should be thought of in a 
transatlantic context. But because the integration process was about creating a 
bulwark against communism, the only reasonable way to look at it will be from a still 
wider perspective: the trans-Eurasian one.   
The trans-Eurasian question 
Economically speaking, the vision formulated by Brzezinski offers a big possibility for 
Finland. And this has been the long-term goal of both the U.S. and the EU. This has 
been an ongoing but slow process since the end of the Cold War. However, the 
Ukrainian crisis revealed the fault lines.  
Ultimately it comes down to values. The expansion of liberal democratic values has 
been a slow but steady process. For Russia, they are currently hard to accept for 
quite obvious reasons.  
Geographically, Russia is a difficult country to govern. It has no natural land borders. 
Historically, the North European Plain has served as an invasion route for many 
powerful armies. From a Russian perspective, the western assurances of a peaceful 
enlargement of NATO seem like nonsense. The good intentions have been proven 
illusory in the past. In 1932 Germany was a peaceful liberal state. In 1939, it was 
something else. And this is deeply embedded in Russian memory. 
An authoritarian regime is needed to keep Russia together. The economic model is 
based on revenues from natural resources distributed by Kremlin to the regions. To 
prevent centrifugal forces, buffers are needed and Ukraine is critical in this sense. 
The fear is that a democratic model would lead to a fragmented outcome.  
So here we are. The democratic west does not want to be a threat to Russia’s 
territorial integrity. However, this is what Russia fears. We face a dilemma that 
seems difficult to solve. The more Russia weakens economically, the more its 
current leadership feels threatened. And the more unpredictable it is likely to 
become.  
As a non-NATO western borderland Finland is unique. Finland matters because it 
happens to be where it happens to be. 
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7 Appendix 1: Travel itinerary 
 
A visit to the United States of America for: 
 
Martti Myllylä 
 
Government of Finland 
16 March to 10 April, 2015 
Washington, DC 
Detroit, Michigan 
Chicago, Illinois 
 
 
Week 1, Washington: 
 
16 March 2015 
Counselor Jukka Salminiitty, Finnish Embassy in Washington, DC. 
 
17 March 2015 
Director Brad Botwin, U.S. Department of Commerce  
 
18 March 2015 
Grand Strategy Seminar, National Defense University, Grand Strategy Conference, Room 
155, Marshall Hall Auditorium 
 
Professor Leon Fuerth, George Washington University 
Leon Fuerth’s assistant: Joanna Nicoletti, The Project on Forward Engagement  
 
19 March 2015 
Director Richard D. Hooker Jr., Ph.D., Director, Institute for National Strategic Studies, 
National Defense University, ft. Lesley J. McNair  
Dr. Hooker’s assistant: Kacey J. Mahoney, Research Analyst 
 
Dr. Christopher Lamb, Distinguished Research Fellow, Institute for National Strategic 
Studies, National Defense University 
 
20 March 2015 
Minister-Counselor Soili Buhanist-Mäkeläinen, Finnish Embassy 
 
 
Week 2, Washington:  
 
23 March 2015 
Edward Alden, Bernard L. Schwartz Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations 
 
24 March 2015 
Maren Leed, Ph.D., Senior Adviser, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Harold 
Brown Chair in Defense Policy Studies 
Dr. Leed’s assistant: Jaimie Hoskins, Program Coordinator  
 
Dr. Timothy Persons, Chief Scientist, U.S. Government Accountability Office 
Dr. Person’s assistant: Juanita A. Aiken 
Susan Offutt, Chief Economist, GAO 
 
25 March 2015 
Stephen Ezell, Director, Global Innovation Policy, The Information Technology & Innovation 
Foundation 
Adams Nager, Economic Research Assistant 
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Kei Koizumi, Assistant Director for Federal R&D, the White House’s Office of Science and 
Technology Policy 
 
26 March 2015 
Mr. John F. Morton, Discussion at the National Press Club 
 
27 March 2015 
G. Mustafa Mohatarem, Chief Economist, Public Policy Center, General Motors Company 
 
Counselor Jukka Salminiitty, Finnish Embassy in Washington, DC. 
Vice President Tom Rauste, Finpro 
 
 
Week 3:  
 
30 March 2015 
Call to Richard A. Lacquement Jr., Ph.D., U.S. Army War College, Dean, School of Strategic 
Landpower 
 
31 March 2015 
Professor Leon Fuerth, George Washington University 
 
1 April 2015 
Defense Counselor Pete Piirainen, Finnish Embassy in Washington, DC. 
Minister Counselor Janne Jokinen, Finnish Embassy in Washington, DC. 
 
2 April 2015 
Desk Officer (European affairs) Jen Levine, Department of Commerce 
Executive Director Seward L. Jones Jr 
Senior Advisor Bart Meroney (manufacturing) 
 
3 April 2015 
Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, SelectUSA 
Felicia Pullam, Director of Outreach 
Alev Gunay, Senior International Investment Specialist 
 
 
Week 4:  
 
6 April 2015 
Flight to Detroit 
 
7 April 2015  
Call to director of Strategic Planning James-Christian Blockwood, GAO 
 
Evening event at the home of Drs. David and Sheila Ronis. Discussions with Louis J. Infante, 
Keith W. Cooley, and many others 
 
8 April 2015 
Meeting with John McElroy, Auto Industry Specialist, www.autoline.tv 
 
Presentation at Walsh College. Lessons learned on the topic  
 
Flight to Chicago  
 
9 April 2015 
Argonne National Laboratory,  Pamela J. Sydelko, Director, Systems Science Center 
 Todd E. Combs, Ph.D., Division Director 
 Leah B. Guzowski, Director, Strategic Programs 
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